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Confidentiality in Mediation 
Jaime Alison Lee & Carl Giesler 
Paranzino v. Barnett Bank, 690 So. 2d 725 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1997); and Bernard v. Galen Group, 901 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995). 
As mediation has become a more widely practiced method of dis-
pute resolution, many jurisdictions have enacted rules1 forbidding 
participants to divulge information discussed during the mediation.2 
Two recent cases, Paranzino v. Barnett Bank3 and Bernard v. Galen 
Group,4 are among the first to deal with the enforcement of such 
rules by judicial sanction. In both cases, participants in judicially-
required mediations were severely sanctioned for breaching confiden-
tiality in violation of mediation rules and/or court orders. 
This case comment will argue that strong judicial commitment to 
confidentiality is critical to the success of the mediation process as a 
means of dispute resolution. However, it also will argue that severe 
sanctions such as those imposed in Bernard and Paranzino are an 
inappropriate means of compelling confidentiality, unless they are 
applied within a framework of carefully deliberated and well-crafted 
rules that fully address the issue's complexity. Valid exceptions to 
1. See Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's Transition from Theory to Imple-
mentation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Partici-
pants, the Process, and the Public, J. DISP. REsOL. 1 (1995); Kent L. Brown, Comment. 
Confidentiality in Mediation, Status and Implications, J. DISP. REsoL. 307, 307 
(1991); Lawrence Freedman, Confidentiality a Closer Leol:, in ABA SPECIAL COW.UT. 
TEE ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION: A PRACTICIONER'S 
GUIDE 47, 49 (Lawrence Freedman et al. eels., 1995). See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 12-2238 (1994) (general), and 25-381.16 (1994) (divorce); CAL. Cw. PRoe. CODE 
§ 1297.371 (West Supp. 1994) (international commercial disputes); CAL. Evm. CODE 
§1152.2 (West Supp. 1994) (general); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§44.101(3) (West Supp. 1994) 
(family), 44.102 (West Supp. 1994) (courl-ordered mediation). 
2. These mandates expand on the confidentiality protections given to the media-
tion process by both common law admissibility doctrine and by state and federal rules 
of evidence. See, e.g., Byrd v. State, 367 S.E.2d 300 (Ga. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that 
party's admissions during a court-mandated mediation were not admissible during 
subsequent trial on grounels of public policy); FED. R Evm. 408 (dealing with "Com-
promises and Offers to Compromise"). 
3. 690 So. 2d 725 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) 
4. 901 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
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the confidentiality rule may exist; rulemakers, whether judicial or 
legislative, must weigh their policy implications and provide partici-
pants in advance with clear rules as to how they will be handled. 
Otherwise, participants will receive overbroad assurances of confi-
dentiality, raising their expectations and simultaneously disap-
pointing them as the rules fall to inevitable challenges and breach. 
Contrary to their intent, strict enforcement of broad guarantees of 
confidentiality will undermine participants' confidence in confidenti-
ality rules and ultimately jeopardize the integrity of the mediation 
process. 
1. THE FACTS OF PARANZINO 
In Paranzino, Victoria Paranzino sued Barnett Bank for breach 
of contract.5 She alleged that she went to a Barnett branch with 
$200,000 in cash to purchase two $100,000 certificates of deposit, but 
that Barnett issued her only one $100,000 certificate despite her 
transmittal of $200,000 to the bank's teller. 6 
Pending litigation, the parties attended court-ordered media-
tion.7 Subsequent to the mediation, the bank offered to settle.8 
Paranzino rejected the proposa1.9 Though the parties signed a writ-
ten agreement binding them to confidentiality, about five months af-
ter the proffered settlement Paranzino, her daughter, and her 
attorney divulged to the Miami Herald their view of the case.10 They 
related not only their version of the facts but also the specific terms of 
Barnett's settlement offer.ll 
Following the publication of the Paranzino's account in the Her-
ald, the bank moved to strike Paranzino's pleadings and to impose 
sanctions, on the ground that Paranzino breached the court-ordered 
confidentiality clause of the mediation agreement signed by the par-
ticipants.12 The trial court granted both requests, dismissing the 
case with prejudice, the severest possible sanction.13 
In sustaining the striking of plaintiffs pleadings as well as the 
dismissal, the appellate court determined that by disclosing details of 
the mediation proceedings, Paranzino had "disregarded the court's 
5. See 690 So. 2d at 726. 
6. See id. 
7. See id. 
8. See id. 
9. See 690 So. 2d at 726. 
10. See id. at 726-27. 
11. See id. 
12. See id. at 727. 
13. See 690 So. 2d at 727. 
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authority."14 The signed mediation agreement and the rules refer-
enced therein mandated confidentiality. IS 
The appellate court also determined that the trial court exercised 
proper discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice.16 It reasoned 
that " [i]f the trial court were to allow this willful and deliberate con-
duct to go unchecked, continued behavior in this vein could have a 
chilling effect upon the mediation process."17 Adopting the strict lan-
guage cited in other Florida cases, the court stated firmly that 
"[w]here the parties do not effectuate a settlement agreement ... the 
confidentiality afforded to parties must remain inviolate. "18 
II. THE FACTS OF BERNARD 
In Bernard, Peter Bernard and the other plaintiffs sued for a pre-
liminary injunction and the appointment of a receiver in a patent, 
copyright, and trademark suit.19 Despite the plaintiffs' objections, 
the trial judge referred the case to mediation.2o The parties were in-
formed of the confidential nature of the proceedings via the written 
notice of selection of a mediator, by at least one court order, and by 
the mediator himself.21 
Shortly after the mediation commenced, the parties related con-
flicting accounts of the mediation through unsolicited letters to the 
judge. The plaintiffs' lead counsel, Donald Cornwell, accused the de-
fendants of "fall[ing] to make any serious settlement offer," making 
the mediation as "a very expensive waste oftime."22 The defendants 
responded that "they ha[d] offered more than is justified or reason-
able and have done everything they can to resolve the matter" and 
requested that the judge "keep the mediation process open."23 
14. See id. 
15. See id. (referencing FLA. STAT. ch. 44.102(3) and FLA. R. CN. P. 1.73). 
16. See id. at 729. 
17. 690 So. 2d at 729. 
18. Id. at 728 (emphasis added) (citing Gordon v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 
641 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994». See also, Royal Caribbean v. Modesto, 614 
So. 2d 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Hudson v. Hudson, 600 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). 
All of these cases involve participants who disclosed proposed settlement terms be-
cause they erroneously thought the settlement was final, although they were not in 
writing or signed as required by the court and therefore did not meet the standard 
permitting for disclosure. 
19. 901 F. Supp. at 780. 
20. See id. 
21. See id. 
22. Id. at 781. 
23. 901 F. Supp. at 781. 
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In a subsequent letter to the judge, Cornwell argued that the de-
fendants' claim "that they have attempted in good faith to settle" con-
stituted "an outrageous attempt to mislead the court."24 Cornwell 
then asserted that the defendant's characterization of the process 
compelled the plaintiffs to "embroil the Court in the details of the 
parties' settlement discussions . . . in order to set the record 
straight."25 Accordingly, he divulged to the judge details of the medi-
ation process, including the specific terms of settlement offers pro-
posed by both the defendants and the plaintiffs.26 
Upon learning of Cornwell's detailed disclosures, the defendants' 
counsel requested sanctions for violating the confidentiality man-
dated by the court order and the mediation provisions.27 In defense, 
Cornwell argued that the defendants "opened the door" by "[choosing] 
to inform the Court about the mediation process in violation of this 
Order and deliberately misrepresented the parties' respective settle-
ment positions to the COurt."28 Furthermore, he claimed, he ''had no 
choice, in view of the defendants' letters to the Court, but to disclose 
'exactly what the status of the [settlement] discussions were."'29 
Judge Denny Chin disagreed. He found that the defendants had 
made no statements that "opened the door" to discussions of the me-
diation communications.30 Moreover, the judge determined that 
Cornwell's claim that he ''had no choice" but to breach confidentiality 
was unjustified, as he could have objected to the defendants' charac-
terizations of the mediation without divulging specific details about 
the settlement amounts, a disclosure that directly violated the court 
order of confidentiality.31 
Accordingly, Judge Chin levied a fine of $2,500 against 
Cornwel1.32 Adopting the language of the Second Circuit, he rea-
soned that "if participants cannot rely on the confidential treatment 
of everything that transpires during [mediations] then counsel of ne-
cessity will feel constrained to conduct themselves in a cautious, 
tight-lipped, non-committal manner more suitable to poker players in 
a high-stakes game than to adversaries attempting to arrive at a just 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 781-82. 
26. See id. at 782. 
27. See 901 F. Supp. at 782. 
28. Id. at 782-83. 
29. See id. 
30. See id. at 782. 
31. See 901 F. Supp. at 783. 
32. See id. at 785. 
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resolution of a civil dispute. "33 In applying this analogy to the media-
tion process of his own jurisdiction, Judge Chin noted that 
"[p]articipants in the Mediation Program rely on the understanding 
that all matters discussed during the mediation process will be kept 
confidential, and the breach of the applicable confidentiality provi-
sions threatens the integrity of the entire Program."34 
ill. A STRONG COMMITMENT TO CONFIDENTIALITY: JUSTIFIED BOTH 
ON THE FACTS AND IN THEORY 
Paranzino and Bernard show that courts are willing to use their 
strongest judicial powers to preserve the confidentiality of the media-
tion process, an approach supported by the facts of the cases and also 
by a central tenet of mediation theory: that the process inherently 
requires a substantial guarantee of confidentiality t-O be effective. 
Based on the facts, the participants were appropriately penalized 
for blatantly ignoring their obligations to keep confidentiality. In 
both cases, the sanctioned participants questioned whether they were 
bound to confidentiality at all, despite clear evidence that they had 
given meaningful consent to their duties of confidentiality. In 
Paranzino, the parties executed and signed a "Mediation Report and 
Agreement," which forbid them to "disclose any discussions" and 
which also referenced the appropriate state statutes and rule of civil 
procedure that more thoroughly delineated the confidentiality re-
quirements.35 In Bernard, the mediator orally t-Old the participants 
of their responsibility, and the court also issued two written orders 
clearly stating: "The entire mediation process is confidential. The 
parties and the Mediator may not disclose information regarding the 
process, the settlement terms, to the court or to third parties unless 
all parties otherwise agree."3G However, the sanctioned counsel in 
Bernard admitted that he simply "didn't pay attention t-O" the court 
order.37 In light of these facts, the courts rejected both parties' 
claims of ignorance and found their breaches to be willful and deliber-
ate.3S Disturbed by the parties' failure to consider both the impor-
tance of confidentiality and the court's authority to regulate their 
33. [d. at 784 (quoting Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 
F.2d 928, 930 (2nd Cir. 1979». 
34. [d. at 784. 
35. See 901 F. Supp. at 783. 
36. [d. at 780. 
37. [d. at 782. 
38. See id. at 784; 690 So. 2d at 728-29 (affirming trial court finding). 
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actions in the proceedings, both courts took appropriately powerful 
steps to deter similar breaches of confidentiality. 
The need for strong deterrence is based on the premise that me-
diation will not be effective if participants are not assured of a sub-
stantial guarantee of confidentiality.39 As the Paranzino court 
recognized, allowing breaches of confidentiality to go "unchecked" 
would have a "chilling effect upon the mediation process."40 There 
are at least two ways in which confidentiality plays a critical role in 
the mediation process: it affords the parties the freedom to partici-
pate fully by protecting both general communications and specific 
settlement offers from disclosure to either the courts or to third par-
ties, and it also protects the integrity of the mediator's role in the 
process. 
It is crucial that parties feel free from fear of disclosure of media-
tion communications to either the court or to third parties.41 Media-
tion asks its participants to identify the full range of their interests 
and encourages them to explore many ways to meet these interests.42 
Fully assessing these interests and options often means divulging to 
the mediator and/or to the other participant sensitive personal infor-
mation and emotional attitudes towards others.43 It might include 
revealing sensitive business information, or making statements of 
fact or law. 44 The breadth of a participant's revelations of such infor-
mation, and thus the success of the mediation in addressing them, 
clearly depends upon the degree of protection that participants have 
against disclosure.45 Parties without adequate protection against 
disclosure will choose not to mediate, or, if ordered to mediate by a 
court, will be less forthright.46 As the Bernard court noted, partici-
pants in non-confidential mediation proceedings ''will ... conduct 
39. See generally, Bruce A. Biltman, Mediation in Florida: The Newly Emerging 
Case Law, 70 FLA. B.J. 44 (1996); Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confi· 
dentiality in Mediation: The Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 37 (1986); 
Kirtley, supra note 1; Christopher H. Macturk, Note, Confidentiality in Mediation: 
The Best Protection Has Exceptions, 19 AM. J. TRIAL Anvoc. 411 (1995); Note, Protect· 
ing Confidentiality In Mediation, 98 HARv. L. REV. 441 (1984). 
40. 690 So. 2d at 729. 
41. See Kirtley, supra note 1, at 9-11; Macturk, supra note 39, at 415, 416; Note, 
supra note 39, at 444-45. 
42. See Kirtley, supra note 1, at 9; Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 38; 
Macturk, supra note 39, at 415; Note, supra note 39, at 445. 
43. See Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 38; Kirtley, supra note 1, at 9. 
44. See Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 38; Kirtley, supra note 1, at 9. 
45. See Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 38; Macturk, supra note 39, at 415. 
46. See Biltman, supra note 39, at 50; Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 38; 
Kirtley, supra note 1, at 17; Macturk, supra note 39, at 415; Note, supra note 39, at 
445. 
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themselves in a cautious, tight-lipped, non-committal manner more 
suitable to poker players .... "47 
Not only do participants require protection against personal em-
barrassment from potential disclosure to third parties or the public; 
they also require assurances that mediation communications will not 
disadvantage them in future court proceedings.48 For example, in 
Bernard, the sanctioned disclosures were not made publicly but t{) 
the presidingjudge.49 Participants require assurances that the medi-
ation process, as an alternative to formal adjudication, will not be 
abused as a means of introducing evidence and information that 
otherwise would be undiscoverable or inadmissible in court. 
In addition to general mediation communications, specific settle-
ment terms (whether merely proposed or accepted) also deserve pro-
tection. Disclosing the terms of an offer, or even the fact that an offer 
is made, might be damaging to participants if used as an example of 
"proof' of wrongdoing,50 if perceived as an admission of guilt, or if 
used as a comparative value on which similar judgments might be 
based in the future. 51 For example, such disclosure of settlement 
terms was sanctioned in Paranzino, where a newspaper printed the 
settlement terms and statements claiming that "the bank would not 
have made the offer unless it felt its case were shaky . ... [the bank) 
handled the transaction badly, and ... the bank's lawyer knows it ... 
"52 Such attempts to use mediation communications as evidence of 
wrongdoing or to "try the case in public" must be prevented to avoid 
chilling the possibilities of settlement. 
Secondly, confidentiality is critical to the effectiveness of the me-
diator.53 Mediators must be perceived as and act as neutrals, actors 
whose personal opinions are irrelevant to the process.54 The appear-
ance of neutrality is substantively damaged if the mediator can be 
called on to testify, either formally or informally, about the substance 
47. 901 F. Supp. at 40. 
48. See Biltman, supra note 39, at 50; Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 38; 
Kirtley, supra note 1, at 9-10; Macturk, supra note 39, at 416. 
49. See 901 F. Supp. at 782. 
50. See Note, supra note 39, at 447-50. 
51. This includes future judgments either decided within the legal system or 
made outside the courtroom, as in future mediations or less formal settings. 
52. 690 So. 2d at 727. 
53. See Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 38; Kirtley, supra note I, at 8; 
Macturk, supra note 39, at 416; Note, supra note 39, at 444-46, 456. 
54. See Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 38; Kirtley, supra note I, at 10, 30-
32; Macturk, supra note 39, at 416; Note, supra note 39, at 446. 
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of the mediation, or about her opinion of the mediation or of the par-
ties.55 "Both the appearance and the reality of the mediator's neu-
trality are essential to generating the climate of trust necessary for 
effective mediation. "56 
In sum, the courts in Paranzino and Bernard are justified in that 
the participants flagrantly disregarded their specified duties of confi-
dentiality, duties that are critical to the integrity of the mediation 
process. Broad confidentiality rules promote a critical degree of can-
dor among the participants by shielding against the inappropriate 
use of mediation information. Without strong confidentiality provi-
sions and appropriate enforcement, parties' candor will diminish as 
lax enforcement repeatedly guts legal promises of confidentiality. 
IV. CASES ALso ILLUSTRATE THE NEED FOR CAREFULLY DRAFI'ED 
RULES AND EXCEPTIONS 
Although the Paranzino and Bernard courts deserve praise for 
taking strong stands on confidentiality, the bluntness of their formu-
las may in fact counteract their intent. Severe sanctions and strict 
confidentiality rules fail to account for the complexity of the role of 
confidentiality in mediation, and overlook potentially valid excep-
tions to the rule. Situations that might merit exceptions to confiden-
tiality include, for example, where participants allege mediator 
misconduct or other complaints about the process itself; where past 
or possible future crimes are disclosed; and where the enforcement of 
mediated agreements calls for parol evidence. Overbroad rules that 
fail to address such situations not only reflect a lack of thoughtful 
policy; they might in fact induce breach. Participants who do have 
valid exceptions are constrained from addressing them by overbroad 
mandates of confidentiality, and they might then turn to breach as 
the only remedy for their concerns. The circumstances of Bernard 
are suggestive of one such scenario, where the participants appear to 
have been motivated to breach, at least in part, by an inability to 
otherwise overcome what they perceived to be a critical flaw in the 
mediation process (namely, bad-faith participation by the adverse 
parties). Furthermore, even though it is often acceptable to carve out 
exceptions to rules after-the-fact in judicial opinions, this means of 
55. See James M. ABsey, Jr., Mum's the Word on Mediation: Confidentiality and 
Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 991, 997 (1996); Freed-
man & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 38; Kirtley, supra note 1, at 10, 30-32; Macturk, 
supra note 39, at 416; Note, supra note 39, at 445-6. 
56. Note, supra note 39, at 445. 
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rule-refinement is wholly inappropriate for rules about confidential-
ity in mediation. For these reasons, broadly sweeping confidentiality 
rules which are intended to strengthen the principle and bolster the 
mediation process might in fact weaken both. 
A Exceptions May Exist 
A number of exceptions have support in other literature and/or 
have been implemented in various jurisdictions by statute, court rule, 
or judicial opinion. Only a few will be mentioned here t~ provide ex-
amples of the range of concerns, but their policy considerations will 
not be considered. 
One example of a well-established exception is where partici-
pants challenge the integrity of the mediation process itself, and need 
to refer to records or communications to support claims of misconduct 
or injustice occurring in the mediation under the veil of confidential-
ity. In these instances, mediation arrangements might have the taint 
of fraud, unfairness, or ambiguity; mediators might act in a biased 
fashion.57 Several jurisdictions have provided for such exceptions.58 
In another example, confidentiality in mediation is used to prevent 
discovery in subsequent court proceedings - an inappropriate appli-
cation of the rule.59 A third possible exception is allowing use of me-
diation communications or settlement agreements as parol evidence 
for enforcement.60 Participants may need to refer not only to written 
agreements to mediate, but also to communications or to settlement 
agreements, in order to prove the understandings they reached or for 
57. See McKinlay v. McKinlay, 648 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding that 
an exception is appropriate to determine whether settlement was signed under du-
ress); Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 43; Kirtley, supra note I, at 49-52; Note, 
supra note 39, at 452. 
58. See e.g., Biltman, supra note 39, at 51 (referencing McKinlay, supra note 57'; 
Maturck, supra note 39, at 433 (describing Colorado exception for mediator disci-
pline), Kirtley, supra note I, at 44 and n.303 (referencing Colorado, Florida, Utah, 
and federal rules for mediator misconduct). 
59. See Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 44; Kirtley, supra note I, at 39-41. 
See also. FLA. STAT. ch. 44.201 (governing mediations of the Citizen Dispute Settle-
ment Centers and specifying that where information discussed in mediations would 
otherwise be discoverable in court proceedings, the confidentiality rule will not hinder 
normal discovery proceedings); Macturk, supra note 39, at 432 (describing Wyoming's 
discovery provision, ensuring that mediation is not effectively transformed into a bur-
ial place for parties' unfavorable evidence). 
60. See Kirtley, supra note I, at 42-44; Macturk, supra note 39, at 429; Note, 
supra note 39, at 452-54. See. e.g., Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger, 249 Va. 376, 
457 S.E.2d 36 (1995). 
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other purposes.61 This type of exception also has been written into a 
number of confidentiality rules.62 As a fourth example, rulemakers 
have granted mediators or participants the freedom, or perhaps even 
the obligation, to reveal admissions of past crimes or to disclose credi-
ble threats to cause physical harm, damage property, or otherwise 
commit a crime.63 Several jurisdictions have taken the position that 
mediation should not serve as a shield for criminal acts.64 
Such policy considerations and many others certainly may weigh 
in favor of limited disclosure and deserve careful deliberation by the 
appropriate rule-making body. 
B. Rules that Fail to Address Exceptions Might Encourage Breach 
Where confidentiality rules fail to address such exceptions, the 
rules may in fact encourage breach. One way in which this may occur 
is with parties who sense that their situation may be a valid excep-
tion to the rule, but who are forbidden by confidentiality to assess 
whether their situation does qualify for an exception with the assist-
ance of the appropriate actors. Such parties may become frustrated 
or confused by the confidentiality rule, and see breach as their only 
recourse. While the outcome of Bernard is justified on its specific 
facts, the case is nevertheless suggestive of how overbroad confidenti-
ality rules might in this way encourage breach.65 
In Bernard, participants' only formal notice of their confidential-
ity duties consisted of court orders that failed to address any poten-
tial exceptions, aside from consent. The court orders simply stated: 
"[T]he entire mediation process is confidential. The parties and the 
Mediator may not disclose information regarding the process, includ-
ing settlement terms, to the court or to third parties unless all parties 
otherwise agree."66 However, the breaching party in Bernard 
thought that he had a legitimate concern about the adverse party's 
bad-faith participation, so detrimental to the mediation process that 
61. See Biltman, supra note 39, at 51-52; Kirtley, supra note 1, at 42-44; Note, 
supra note 39, at 452-54. 
62. See FLA. STAT. ch. 900408; Macturk, supra note 39, at 429, 432. 
63. See Biltman, supra note 39, at 31; Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 39, at 44; 
Kirtley, supra note 1, at 43-48. 
64. See FLA. STAT. ch. 10.08 (creating exceptions for child abuse); Freedman & 
Prigofif, supra note 39, at 44; Macturk, supra note 39, at 432, 438. 
65. This is in contrast to Paranzino, where the breach does not appear to be moti-
vated by such frustration. In addition, the participants in that case were formally 
advised of Florida rules explaining two exceptions to confidentiality that had been 
deliberated through a legitimate rulemaking process. See 690 So. 2d at 726. 
66. 910 F. Supp. at 780 (emphasis added). 
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he was unwilling to travel from out-of-state for further sessions.67 
Frustrated further by the representations of good-faith that were 
made by the adverse parties, the breaching participant felt he "had 
no choice" but to breach this rule in order to prove, through disclosure 
"exactly what the status of the [settlement] discussions were."68 
While in Bernard the court properly rejected this claim for other 
reasons, the Bernard facts are suggestive of a situation where a par-
ticipant might be induced to breach overbroad confidentiality rules. 
It can be difficult to prove bad faith69 or other participant misconduct 
without disclosing some information about the mediation, and it ap-
pears that the parties in Bernard had no guidance as t.o how to lodge 
such a complaint without breaching confidentiality.7o Under such 
circumstances, it is reasonable that participants might truly think 
that there is "no choice" but to breach. If the rule appears overly 
broad, and if the party thinks she has a valid exception to the rule yet 
has no guidance as to how to remedy her situation within the confines 
of the rule, she may see breach as the only way to assert or assess her 
right to an exception. 
Bernard suggests one way in which broadly stated rules, in-
tended to give strong support to confidentiality rules, might backfire 
and encourage breach. Such breaches can be avoided if rules eAlllic-
itly address potential exceptions, or, at minimum, if the rules provide 
a way for participants to discuss their concerns without breaking 
confidentiality. 
c. Creating Exceptions Through Post Hoc Common Law 
Rulemaking Is Inappropriate for Confidentiality Rules 
Traditionally, overbroad rules or laws are subject to refinement 
through the judicial process by which case-by-case evaluations adjust 
the rules to make appropriate exceptions. However, in the case of 
mediation confidentiality, this means of addressing exceptions is 
wholly inappropriate in that it inherently contradicts the principle of 
confidentiality. 
67. See id. at 781-82. 
68. Id. at 782. 
69. For a discussion on implementing a bad-faith e.xception, see Kirtley, supra 
note 1, at 49-51. 
70. The only guidance given to the participants appears to be the vaguely worded 
court order and the Guide to the Court's Civil Justice EAllense and Delay Reduction 
Plan, which was relied upon by the Bernard court in crafting its court order on confi-
dentiality, although it is entirely unclear whether it covers any exceptions or whether 
the parties were referred to it or given access to it. See 901 F. Supp. at 779-80. 
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Overbroad confidentiality rules, like any other overbroad rules, 
are susceptible to judicially-created exceptions being carved out after 
the fact-after mediation is over. The difficulty is that broad assur-
ances explicitly establish high expectations of confidentiality, but 
these expectations are also likely to be scuttled as participants chal-
lenge the rules, either informally as in Bernard or formally via the 
post hoc judicial exception-making process. The danger of contraven-
ing expectations in this way is that participants will conclude that 
the initial assurances of confidentiality had no substantive meaning, 
and may question the integrity of the entire process. This is substan-
tially damaging to mediation because, for the reasons explained 
above, the success of the mediation depends to a great extent on how 
much faith participants have in the assurance confidentiality when 
they enter the process; repeated violations of parties' expectations 
will decrease the public's faith in the mediation process. Thus, excep-
tions must not only be clearly stated, but their creation should not be 
left to traditional post hoc judicial deliberation. 
Substantively, potential exceptions deserve thoughtful analysis 
as to their policy ramifications; structurally, they are critical to the 
integrity of the mediation process. At a minimum, rules should pro-
vide some means by which participants safely may address their con-
cerns about confidentiality and possible exceptions. Otherwise, 
participants will challenge the rule (either formally or informally) 
and will violate the expectations it created, jeopardizing the public's 
faith in confidentiality and thus in mediation. 
v. SUMMARY 
Although a strong commitment to confidentiality on the part of 
the judiciary is appropriate and essential to the success of mediation, 
hard-line rules might be inadequate to address the complexity of con-
fidentiality rules and the need for exceptions. While judicial orders 
may encourage participants to take confidentiality seriously by 
speaking in plain language and with conviction, such simplistic or-
ders cannot serve as a proxy for a full and well-developed body of 
regulation. Clearly, egregious breaches such as those in Paranzino 
and Bernard require strong deterrence. But such strict adherence to 
confidentiality is not always appropriate, and exceptions must be con-
sidered as a matter of good policy-making. Furthermore, overly strict 
confidentiality rules might in fact induce breach when parties feel 
they have no other means of asserting or assessing their entitlement 
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to an exception. Feeble guarantees of confidentiality and lax enforce-
ment clearly deter full participation in the mediation process; over-
broad rules and enforcement may have a similar effect. 
Clear, pre-established rules that address concerns about excep-
tions are especially critical because post hoc exception-making coun-
teracts one of the central goals of mediation confidentiality-assuring 
freedom from fear of disclosure when participants enter the process. 
In cases where courts craft exceptions after the fact, they defeat the 
initial guarantees of confidentiality, jeopardizing the integrity of the 
rules. By imposing oversimple confidentiality rules that ignore possi-
ble exceptions, courts that intend to promote mediation and 
strengthen its foundations may well end up weakening the public's 
confidence in the process. 
